Towards Automatic Voter Registration: Lessons from Canada and Australia

A report for the UK Democracy Fund

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Introduction

The UK government has proposed to move toward automatic voter registration (AVR), whereby public officials can directly enrol eligible individuals on the electoral register. Unlike the current system, this does not require a proactive application from citizens as the information is drawn from government datasets. A well-designed system would help to modernise the UK's registration processes by improving the completeness and accuracy of the voter roll, while also reducing costs and simplifying the work of local electoral officials (James and Garnett, 2024).

Key findings

- **Automated and assisted voter registration can be implemented without a civil population register.**
- **Automatic and assisted registration can be combined for maximum effect.**
- **High quality data sources can be added to at later stages of roll out.**
- **Transparency is critical to implementation.**

Transitioning to AVR is a major undertaking, which will require appropriate planning, investment, inter-agency cooperation, and privacy safeguards. As the UK does not have a civil population register, election officials will need to draw on multiple databases. The government has committed to enfranchising 16- and 17-year-olds, so the system will need to cover a whole new cohort of voters. There is also the question of moving from a decentralised system of voter registers held by Local Authorities. Although not mentioned in the government policy paper, a single centralised register would make it easier to identify duplicate entries, update information when voters move constituency, and enable people to check they are correctly registered (James, Bernal, and Berry, 2025).

Other countries offer valuable insights into how modern registration systems can be designed and implemented. Canada and Australia are particularly relevant cases, as both have registers maintained using a range of government data sources. Their systems are not fully 'automatic' and eligible electors are still encouraged to self-enrol and keep their details up to date. However, the electoral bodies also use assisted and automated processes with a range of checks and balances that ensure privacy and accuracy in contexts where there is no definitive civil register to maintain their electoral registers.

The approach has produced a measurable improvement in the quality of the electoral register in Australia: 97.6% of the eligible population is now on the voter register, compared to 90.9% in the 2010 election before direct enrolment and update were

adopted. In Canada, the goal was to maintain the coverage achieved by the old method of door-to-door registration, while reducing costs and administrative demands during the election period. This has been achieved with coverage of 92% or more over the past two decades (96.2% in 2025) and savings reported at federal and sub-national levels following its adoption.

This policy paper reviews voter registration reforms in Canada and Australia, drawing on policy reports, academic literature, and interviews with current and former officials from Elections Canada and the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC). The focus is the national level, noting that both countries have federal systems, and the states and the territories (in Australia), and provinces, territories and some municipalities (in Canada), manage their own elections. It considers the timelines, data sources, approaches to data sharing, privacy safeguards and quality measures used in the two countries to identify lessons for the UK.

Key lessons for the UK

Australia and Canada demonstrate the value of using automated and assisted voter registration processes. Both were facing challenges with enrolment and turned to more data-focused solutions. Today the quality of their registers is much higher than would be possible to achieve without this modernisation.

Despite the complexity of their respective systems, both countries were able to establish the foundations for their assisted/direct enrolment and update systems within 18 months, demonstrating that it is possible to establish an automated register in a relatively limited time frame. However, it is also important that action is taken early in a parliament to enable this. Implementation in the UK should initially focus on establishing systems with a limited number of high-quality data inputs. Additional data can then be added at later stages.

The two countries show that even in the absence of a single population register, the completeness and accuracy of the register can be improved. They highlight that there are advantages of combining assisted forms of enrolment, i.e. encouraging voters to register themselves through nudges and reminders, with automated systems to ensure the register is effectively maintained. This combined approach could work well in the UK, reducing the risk of disenfranchisement that might be associated with moving directly to a fully automated system.

Any system which draws on data from elsewhere requires clear systems for processing data, tracking updates, and ensuring the privacy and security of both the data that is transferred and the register itself. Australia and Canada offer insights into how this can be done by implementing best privacy practices and robust information-sharing agreements. They also underscore that election experts need to closely manage development and testing of the underlying systems. These are invariably bespoke as they need to meet the specific requirements of the electoral system and have strong physical and cybersecurity safeguards in place.

Implementation in the UK should initially focus on establishing systems with a limited number of high-quality data inputs. Additional data can then be added at later stages.

Transparency is also key. The public in both countries generally appreciate the enrolment and update systems, but this has been facilitated by the electoral bodies providing clear information on how the system works, how data is used, the privacy safeguards in place and the quality checks that are undertaken to ensure the robustness of the register.

Are the UK, Australia and Canada comparable?

It is important to acknowledge differences between the UK's electoral system and the cases considered in this paper. Unlike Australia and Canada, the UK is a unitary state. Nevertheless, election law is devolved in Scotland and Wales, which means that lessons from Australia and Canada's roll sharing arrangements with states/territories/provinces can offer lessons for managing the register so that it serves the home nations effectively. Australia and Canada benefitted from having centralised electoral management bodies, which were able to move quickly once legal changes were made. The Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) already managed the federal electoral roll centrally and had established relationships with state and Commonwealth government agencies for continuous voter registration. Although a whole new system was developed to enable direct enrolment and update, the Australian Electoral Commission was operating with familiar data and partners.

Continuous online registration has already been established in the UK. However, the Electoral Commission does not have the same statutory powers as the AEC or Elections Canada and there is no single body responsible for electoral registration. Centralising the register would be important to achieve the full benefits of an automated system and – if this path was taken – it would take time to construct a single national electoral register. Bringing together disparate voter rolls to one place will be a challenge, which even Canada did not face as the temporary registers it used before the permanent register was introduced were centralised.

There is also the question of how a single digital national identity system, which has also been announced by the UK government, would change the equation. A digital ID has the potential to support automatic voter registration, but the registration system would likely need to interact with other data sources to capture details like address changes. Moreover, the current proposals suggest the ID will only be compulsory for those seeking employment, so additional sources of information would be necessary to ensure key groups, such as students and pensioners, are not excluded.

Recommendations

- ✓ The UK government should fast track plans to improve voter registration by introducing automatic and assisted voter registration so the benefits can be realised by the next election. This could be achieved by pushing ahead with one or two high-quality datasets and then piloting further datasets to expand the system.

- ✓ Assisted voter registration could be introduced by prompting citizens to register to vote when they interact with other government services.

- ✓ Legislation is introduced to give the Electoral Registration Officers the power to register eligible electors without the need for them to make an application. It should:
  - Provide Electoral Registration Officers with access to key sources of data to enable them to register electors.
  - Enable assisted voter registration when electors interact with other government services.

- ✓ Priority should be given to using large datasets which contain high-quality data for electoral registration.

- ✓ There should be a transparent and inclusive process for devising the system, including civil society groups, practitioners, political parties and academics. An Elections Working Group, with a broad membership and a clear responsibility and remit should be established to enable this.

- ✓ There should be a continuous review of the performance of the system through this Working Group. This is essential to ensuring it is fit for purpose and making improvements in the future.

- ✓ Clear information about the sources of data, how information is used and the privacy safeguards in place should be made available to all electors.

Canada

To be eligible to vote in Canadian general elections, you must be a citizen over the age of 18 and on the National Register of Electors. The Register is a permanent and continuously updated database of eligible electors, which was created in the late 1990s. Prior to that, Elections Canada would recruit temporary officials to go door-to-door to establish who was living at each address and create the register for each election. However, this became less sustainable as Canada's population grew in size and diversity, lifestyles changed, and it became harder to recruit people to do the door-knocking.

In 1996, Elections Canada undertook a feasibility study, which established the cost effectiveness of a permanent register, identified sources of data for maintaining it, and offered a roadmap for implementation. Enabling legislation was passed later the same year, and Elections Canada embarked on the process of developing the necessary infrastructure and negotiating with data providers. A final door-knocking exercise was conducted in April 1997, with the resulting list used for the 1997 general election and as the foundation for the permanent Register. The new Register was first used for a by-election in March 1998 and a general election in 2000.

< 1990s
Door-to-door registration exercise for every federal election.

1996
Feasibility study & enabling legal changes for National Register of Electors.

1997-2000
Final door-knocking exercise. Data partnerships negotiated.

2000
New Register used for the first time in the federal election.

2000-present
Refinement and establishment of Register of Future Electors.

The National Register of Electors

The Register includes each person's name, address, gender, date of birth, and unique identifier. The system was developed by a private company, with oversight from a dedicated committee of IT and election management experts within Elections Canada that rigorously tested the software during its development. The system comprises a 'master' database, which sits in the background and is protected from direct updates, and a 'transactional' public-facing database to help maintain the security and integrity of the Register. The master database includes both active records, i.e. registered electors who would be included in preliminary lists extracted for an election, and others that are non-active, whether because they have passed away, moved to an unknown address, or their eligibility has not been confirmed.

In 2019, Elections Canada created a Register of Future Electors, which enables 14–17-year-old Canadians to register so that they are automatically added to the Register when they turn 18. This initiative aimed to improve civic awareness and address the issue of low enrolment rates among 18–24-year-olds.

As enrolment is not compulsory in Canada, the Register operates based on active consent. The elector can opt in to the Register by self-enrolling, either directly or by registering with their provincial or territorial electoral body that then shares the data with Elections Canada. For federal data to be used to create an enrolment, the individual must have agreed for their data to be used for that purpose. In the early 2000s, tax forms were adapted to include boxes which Canadians can tick to share relevant data for electoral purposes and confirm their citizenship. Individuals applying for Canadian citizenship are similarly prompted to authorise Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada to share their data to be added to the Register as soon as they become eligible.

Elections Canada does not write to electors to confirm their enrolment or changes to their records on the basis they have agreed for their data to be used for this purpose.[1] However, Canadians can check their registration online and when an election is called, voter information cards are sent to each elector's registered address. As enrolment is voluntary, Canadians can also opt out of the Register and chose to actively enrol for each election.

Data sources and sharing

Election Canada today receives data from around 40 federal and provincial/territorial sources. From the outset, the key providers have been:

- Canada Revenue Agency
- Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada
- Provincial/territorial drivers' licence and vital statistics agencies
- Electoral bodies in the states and territories

The frequency of data transfers varies by provider but is either monthly, bi-monthly or quarterly. Full files are supplied, as Elections Canada has learned that updates can be missed if they only receive the summary data of recent record changes. Electoral bodies provide data on request, usually after sub-national elections when there is a spike in updates. As revisions are routinely made after lists are extracted for an election and electors have the option to register in-person on election days, the Register is also updated after every general election or by-election to ensure these enrolments are captured for future elections.

[1] The electoral body does occasionally conduct mailouts with the aim of improving the quality of the register, e.g. to verify information that appears to be out of date and encourage young people flagged in the data as potential voters to confirm their eligibility.



Figure 1 Canadian registration channels

**If data flags that an individual is no longer eligible (e.g. deceased, not a citizen) they remain on the master database but are set to inactive.*

Statistics Canada estimates that around 13% of elector information changes each year, as people change their addresses or names. To keep up with this, millions of records are received, checked against the existing register, and used to update or add enrolments. The use of multiple sources means the data is not received in uniform formats and must be standardised on receipt. It also invariably produces some conflicting information that cannot easily be triangulated. If there is any uncertainty, changes are not made.

Elections Canada has information-sharing agreements with every provider. In Canada's federal system, there was no precedent for the high degree of collaboration across different governments, so early negotiations were complex, and partners often had to be persuaded of the benefits of contributing to the Register. To facilitate this, an Advisory Committee to the National Register of Electors was created to provide a forum for provincial/territorial electoral partners and data suppliers to better understand the system and discuss best practices when the Register was first established. Over time, however, the relationships matured and a dedicated committee was no longer deemed necessary.[2]

Elections Canada now offers a standard information sharing template that specifies appropriate uses, disclosure, and handling and destruction of data in line with privacy best practice as well as relevant legislated requirements. It lays out the steps required in case of a privacy breach and includes compliance monitoring and audit clauses, allowing the data provider to request a review to ensure the terms of the agreement are adhered to. While bigger providers prefer to develop their own agreements – and have the capacity to do so – the template makes it easier to ensure all agreements are robust. Data is transferred using a secure File Transfer Protocol (FTP).

[2] Other forums have since been established to facilitate broader election management cooperation, such as the Secretariat for Electoral Coordination.

Information sharing agreements have a five-year expiry date and are renewed on a rolling basis. This allows any changes in technology, costs, or good privacy practice to be incorporated. However, managing the renewals is administratively demanding and Elections Canada is exploring 10-year terms or extension clauses to reduce this burden.

Quality and eligibility

Elections Canada assesses the quality of the Register against three measures every registration cycle:[3]

1. the proportion of eligible electors that are registered (coverage)
2. the proportion of eligible electors listed at the correct address (currency)
3. the proportion of registered electors listed at the correct address (accuracy)[4]

The assessment is made using population data from Statistics Canada.

Indicator	2025 Target	2025 General Election
Coverage	95%	96.2%
Currency	86%	89.5%
Accuracy	90%	93.0%

Table 1 Quality measures, 2025 targets and percentages following the 2025 election. Data provided by Elections Canada.

A national Data Quality Confirmation Study is periodically conducted to provide additional assurance. Since 2018, this has been undertaken by Statistics Canada, which can match Register records with the data it holds. The results independently confirm the quality estimates and help identify areas for improvement. There have also been two audits since the Register was established, one conducted by the Auditor General of Canada in 2005, and another conducted jointly by the Auditor General and Privacy Commissioner in 2008 as part of a review of large federal databases.

Elections Canada is required by the law to provide the list of electors to MPs and political parties annually. When this is done, it publishes an 'Updates' report on its website, summarising the changes to the Register and quality statistics for that year. It also reiterates the data sources used and how quality is assessed. This provides a high degree of transparency for citizens and contributes to confidence in the Register.

[3] The length of a cycle varies, particularly in federal election years, but there are normally 2-3 per year.

[4] The key distinction is that currency looks at the percentage of **all** eligible electors who are correctly registered, whereas accuracy considers only those who are actually registered.

Ensuring eligibility is a challenge. Driver licencing data can only be used to update records (rather than enrol electors) because they do not confirm citizenship. Elections Canada accepts attestation as sufficient proof of citizenship to be added to the Register. However, the elector themselves must do this, whether in-person (e.g. when registering on polling day), online via self-enrolment channels or via their tax form/citizenship application. Since 2019, Elections Canada has also been receiving Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada data on permanent residents and foreign nationals, which makes it easier to check the Register for non-citizens.

Privacy protections

The Register can only be used for electoral purposes, i.e. administering general elections and providing information to other Canadian electoral bodies in the provinces and territories for their elections. To reduce the privacy risks associated with sharing annual lists of electors with MPs and political parties, as Elections Canada is legally required to do, the lists do not include date of birth or gender data and recipients are provided with guidelines on authorised uses. The unique identifier is retained as parties and candidates are also eligible to receive statements of electors who have voted during an election, and the identifier enables them to be matched to lists of electors. This facilitates turnout and voter engagement activities.

From the outset, Elections Canada has prioritised privacy, recognising that this was the primary concern for citizens, politicians and the media. The legislation itself included protections for voters and penalties for misuse of Register data, and the information sharing agreements ensure best practices are followed. There are also numerous system safeguards in place, for example by separating the master and public-facing databases, implementing firewalls, and controlling employee access to the Register.

Public response

Electors generally appreciate the Register. The 1996 feasibility study found that 90% of Canadians supported the establishment of a permanent voter register. There were concerns about the reliability of the Register the first time it was used in 2000, with the media and survey data reporting numerous cases of incorrect or missing voter information cards and parliament questioning whether traditionally disadvantaged groups had been effectively included. However, by the 2004 election, the list quality had improved markedly thanks to a range of refinements. Today, there is an expectation among citizens that there should be sufficient coordination between governments, so an individual only needs to update their information once if it changes. Elections Canada also makes every effort to be transparent, providing information about data sources, privacy protections and the quality of the Register.

Australia



It is a legal requirement for Australian citizens over the age of 18 who have been at lived at their permanent address for one month to enrol and vote. Until 1999, the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) maintained the federal electoral roll by conducting 'habitation reviews' (door-knocking exercises) every two years. This was replaced by continuous roll update, where eligible citizens could enrol or update their details at any time by submitting a physical enrolment form to the AEC. While it remained the responsibility of the individual to enrol, the AEC could refer to federal, state and territory data sources to identify people who had moved or were unregistered and invite them to take action. However, while the AEC could remove electors if there was sufficient evidence that they were no longer at their registered address, it could not automatically add or update any details.

From the late 2000s, concerns about declining voter registration increased the appeal of Federal Direct Enrolment and Update (FDEU), i.e. allowing the AEC to use approved data sources to directly maintain the electoral register. The Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters first recommended changing the law to allow FDEU in 2009. A government Green Paper published shortly after highlighted that over one million eligible voters were not enrolled and that the gap between the estimated eligible population and those on the register was widening. The AEC itself also advocated for FDEU to counter the shortcomings of continuous roll update.

In its review of the 2010 election, the Joint Standing Committee once again recommended that the law should be amended. The enabling legislation was passed in June 2012 and came into force the following month. The AEC moved quickly to implement the system ahead of the next federal elections, providing staff with intensive training and building on the relationships and systems already established as part of the continuous roll update. It ran a pilot in Tasmania in late 2012, then rolled out FDEU progressively across the rest of Australia. By the time the elections were held in September 2013, the AEC reported that 120,000 people had been either enrolled for the first time or re-enrolled, and 532,000 people had had their details updated.

It is important to note that direct enrolment and update was not a silver bullet. The AEC only reached its enrolment rate target of 95% in 2016 and this was achieved by using FDEU in combination with enabling Australians to self-enrol online and proactive outreach activities.

< 1999	1999-2012	2012	2012-2013	2013-present
Biennial habitation reviews (door-knocking)	Continuous Voter Registration	Legal changes enable Federal Direct Enrolment and Update (FDEU)	Piloting and phased rollout of FDEU for 2013 elections	Refinement and modernisation of FDEU processes

Federal Direct Enrolment and Update

FDEU draws on trusted sources of data from other government agencies to maintain the federal electoral roll. If the data flags an update or new enrolment and the AEC can verify eligibility, the individual is notified and given the 28 days to challenge or confirm it themselves. Changes will only be made directly if no response is received. The person will also be notified when the update or enrolment has been implemented. Australians can check their enrolment using a simple online tool. They can also register from the age of 16, however, as enrolment is not compulsory for those under 18, young people will not be directly added to the roll until they reach voting age.

Polling day registration is not available at federal elections. The roll closes seven days after the writs are issued (i.e. election is formally called) and no further changes can be made for that election. If an elector turns up to vote and is not on the list, they are asked to submit a declaration vote with relevant registration details on the envelope. This is then processed as an enrolment form so they will be on the register for future elections.

A key difference compared to the Canadian system is that FDEU effectively operates on an 'opt out' rather than an 'opt in' basis: electors are informed but if they do not respond to the AEC's communication, the direct enrolment or update is made. This approach is appropriate in a context where enrolment is compulsory, but it makes it even more important that the data used is accurate and reliable.



Figure 2 Australian registration channels

Data sources and sharing

The AEC's systems draw on data from government agencies including:

- Services Australia
- the National Exchange of Vehicle and Driver Information System
- the Australian Tax Office
- the Department of Home Affairs
- State/territory departments of birth, deaths and marriages

Information is received daily, monthly or quarterly depending on the source. In 2024, the AEC loaded 6.8 million records and sent 1.3 million FDEU notification letters. This translated to around 290,000 direct enrolments (or re-enrolments) and one million direct updates.

Data is only drawn from sources deemed to be of the highest quality and the AEC prioritises national data sources were possible. Only a limited number of sources have been added since FDEU was established, such as the Department of Home Affairs in 2020 to help capture new Australian citizens.[5] The Electoral Act enables the AEC to 'demand' information from other government agencies to manage the roll. In practice, the relationship with data providers is more collegiate and based on Memorandums of Understanding or similar agreements that outline data requirements, technical details, and any payment arrangements etc. Agreements are generally reviewed every five years or as needed to ensure the data supplied and transfer arrangements are fit for purpose. All transfers are made by the AEC's FTP to their secure server.

The electoral roll is used to produce the certified lists used in federal elections. The AEC also has joint roll partnerships with the states and territories' electoral commissions and provides these entities with the data for their elections, again via their secure server. In the past there were challenges around 'roll divergence', where the modes of enrolment used by some state/territory electoral commissions meant the information could not be used for the federal register and vice versa. However, legislation and procedural changes mean these issues have been resolved and the AEC manages the roll centrally. Sub-national partners might pass enrolment forms (or declaration envelopes with enrolment information) to the AEC for processing but otherwise data flows one way to the state and territory electoral commissions.

[5] The AEC had been using Home Affairs data since 2011 to verify eligibility but not for FDEU. As a result, there was already a high level of confidence in the data.

A version of the electoral roll is available for inspection via a public access terminal at AEC offices, subject to terms and conditions that prohibits the information being copied or recorded with any electronic device. The law also allows the AEC to disclose electoral roll information for specific purposes to MPs, Senators, parties, candidates and a range of other agencies laid out in the Electoral and Referendum Regulation 2016.

Quality and eligibility

There are multiple measures in place to ensure the quality of the roll is maintained. The system is substantially automated and governed by established business rules which ensure validity and consistency. In addition, a team of around 40 people manage the national roll on an ongoing basis, performing regular human checks on incoming data to check for irregularities.[6] Specialist technology is used to match data against the roll and individual records are flagged for review if there is any uncertainty about a match. A roll integrity review is conducted annually, where records are matched to external data sources with an emphasis on checking for both address and divisional accuracy (i.e. are they registered to vote in the constituency that they live in?). There are also mechanisms for external oversight. For example, enrolment is routinely reviewed by the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters as part of their election inquiries and the Australian National Audit Office has conducted several audits, most recently in 2015.

The AEC has thorough mechanisms, checks and balances to ensure only eligible electors are directly enrolled and there have been no incidents of ineligible people being added. Like the UK, Australia does not have a definitive register of citizens, so eligibility is primarily verified against passport data, Department of Home Affairs citizenship data, and birth records. However, there are some people who may not appear in these records, most notably Indigenous Australians. The AEC therefore works closely with Services Australia, which has direct and ongoing links with relevant communities, to verify eligibility in these scenarios. The arrangement demonstrates the value of building trusted partnerships with providers who supply not just data but critical contextual information that can facilitate inclusion.

Privacy protections

Before rolling out FDEU, the AEC conducted a Privacy Impact Assessment. This outlined key privacy principles and necessary safeguards, most of which had already been adopted for handling personal data as part of continuous roll update.

[6] In the period between when an election is called and the close of rolls, there is always a spike in self-enrolments and updates as electors are more motivated to ensure their information is up to date. The AEC employ extra staff at these busy times to ensure the quality of the register is maintained.

The AEC errs on the side of caution, so no direct changes are initiated if there is any uncertainty or different data sources provide conflicting information. There are also special categories of electors that are not added or updated through FDEU, such as silent electors or those experiencing homelessness. These individuals must self-enrol via special category web forms and/or provide additional information to ensure their requirements are catered for. The AEC also maintains a register of people who are potentially ineligible for enrolment, for example because their citizenship has been revoked or they have been removed due to cognitive impairment.[7] This ensures that these individuals will not be re-enrolled by FDEU.

Privacy considerations have also come to the forefront as the AEC has sought to modernise how it communicates with citizens. Traditionally, FDEU notifications have been sent by post. However, this is an increasingly costly and inefficient way of communicating, and the AEC are seeking to better utilise electronic channels, including to prompt people to self-enrol or update their details even before an FDEU letter is sent or where the data available is insufficient to enable them to be directly added. This requires extra checks to ensure that contact details such as e-mail addresses are accurate before using them for correspondence.

Enrolment processes are consistently monitored for potential fraud, with various triggers built into the system. A range of checks conducted monthly, and any records or updates deemed suspicious are investigated. Deeper dives are also conducted periodically, for example during an election when the roll might be more of a target. For these exercises, the roll integrity team work with fraud investigation specialists within the AEC to provide a higher degree of assurance.

Public response

Australia has compulsory enrolment and voting, with participation framed as both a right and responsibility. As processes for continuous roll update had already been established, there were limited communications about the transition to FDEU, beyond the letters of notification that were sent to electors under the new system. Most of the early objections were raised by politicians and related to concerns about the quality of data inputs, but these have been allayed over time by the effectiveness of the system. The AEC does more today to promote how the roll is managed, for example through explainer videos, as part of a broader proactive approach to building citizen trust in Australian federal elections.

[7] Electors can only be removed if they are 'incapable of understanding the nature and significance of enrolment and voting'. In these circumstances, a relative must notify the AEC and include a medical certificate from a registered medical practitioner.

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